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Some of our most pressing policy choices involve thorny intertemporal dilemmas. To 
produce a skilled workforce, mitigate climate change, prepare for disasters, or keep public 
debt sustainable, governments have to take costly action today (e.g., raise taxes, cut 
benefits, impose regulations) with benefits arriving in the long run. Given the risks 
involved, electoral and otherwise, politicians have strong incentives to privilege policies 
with more immediate returns and to renege prior long-term commitments in such policy 
areas, rolling over the costs of inaction to future generations (Nordhaus 1975; Thompson 
2010). An unusually blunt statement from the former director of the Spanish Budgetary 
Office, Álvaro Nadal, is a case in point. “We should reduce investment in research and 
development,” he argued to explain cutbacks in research, “as they are no profitable option 
in the short term” (Expansión, 2015).  
To address short-termism in public policymaking and to more suitably discharge our 
duties toward future generations, numerous institutional reforms have been proposed and 
attempted in recent decades (United Nations Secretary-General, 2013; Oxford Martin 
Commission for Future Generations, 2013; González-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016a; Boston 
2017; Caney, 2019). This chapter focuses on two prominent kinds: insulating and 
constraining devices (Brunner, et al., 2012; Jacobs and Matthews, 2017). Insulating 
devices, such as independent agencies and watchdogs, aim at shielding policymaking from 
short-termist pressures by transferring authority away from elected officials. Constraining 
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devices, by contrast, seek to bind elected officials to certain intertemporally appropriate 
rules from which deviation is costly. They comprise hypothecated taxes, trust funds, and 
constitutional principles of intergenerational fairness, which many countries have adopted 
and courts in the Philippines, Chile, or the Netherlands have enforced. 
Insofar as these and similar institutions can be intentionally designed, questions about 
their effectiveness and legitimacy arise, which much recent normative research has tackled 
and this chapter inspects. Section 1 discusses sufficientarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian 
theories of our duties toward future generations and when a focus on the short term in 
public policymaking may infringe them. Section 2 surveys future-beneficial and future-
focused institutions and, among these, constraining and insulating devices. Section 3 
presents two criteria to assess such devices: their effectiveness to address the epistemic, 
motivational, and institutional sources of short-termism and their legitimacy in allocating 
power, intra- and intergenerationally. Section 4 discusses how well constraining and 
insulating devices fare as to these criteria. Although constraining devices are generally 
better equipped to satisfy them, I argue, insulating devices may be suitably designed to 
address some of their shortcomings. Section 5 concludes by discussing some areas for 
future research. 
 
1. Wrongful short-termism and intergenerational justice 
 
Many of our policy choices today will importantly affect future generations—a category 
that comprises two distinct groups: those who, like children, are not yet citizens and those 
who are not yet born. Some policy choices, such as the amount of public debt we 
accumulate or how much we invest in early education, will affect the former. Some others, 
like nuclear waste management or climate change policies, will have much longer life 
spans, also affecting generations yet unborn. Both kinds of policy choices, however, 
involve tradeoffs between immediate and future benefits, and are likewise liable to short-
termist pressures in public policymaking. For elected officials have strong incentives to 
privilege policies with payoffs arriving before the next election and to renege prior 
farsighted commitments that may be optimal in the long term yet not in the short run. No 
wonder many, like Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, refer to short-termism 
as “the virus, the disease, some would say the epidemic [that] threatens [our] long-term 
future” (Gallery and Gallery, 2009: 275). 
Yet privileging the short term need not always be wrongful. If, for example, we can 
safely expect future generations to be wealthier than us, then passing greater financial 
burdens on to them may be justified due to diminishing marginal utility or to a distributive 
principle that puts the worst off first (Price, 2003). And discounting the value of future 
benefits in public policymaking may also be permissible to account for the profitable 
investment opportunities that are foregone (Broome, 1994). 
What, then, makes short-termism wrongful? First, there are cases in which an 
excessive focus on the short run may yield an inefficient allocation of burdens and benefits 
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across time and generations. For example, Heckman, et al. (2010) suggest that investing $1 
on preschool education targeted at disadvantaged African-American youth yields $12,2 in 
long-term social gains, after discounting such gains at 5 percent per annum. And the 
immediate imposition of a carbon tax of $27 per ton, rising to $90 per ton by 2050, would 
pay for itself over the long run in avoided losses to GDP, after discounting future benefits 
at 4 percent per annum, Nordhaus (2008) argues. Failing to act in these cases because short-
term gains are privileged, brings about, other things equal, inefficient outcomes.  
A second kind of wrongful short-termism, which often overlaps with the first, occurs 
when present policies infringe our duties toward future generations, which failing to invest 
in early education or leaving climate change unabated, for example, would prima facie do. 
We need, however, a full normative account of such duties. For ascertaining when exactly, 
and to what extent, privileging present interests over future ones is wrongful in this second 
sense will depend on the particular obligations toward future generations we have.  
 
1.1. Theories of intergenerational justice 
 
Theories of intergenerational justice address our duties to both past and future generations. 
We here focus on the latter, whose content has prompted two kinds of questions. One, 
which we sidestep here, is whether anything is owed to individuals who do not yet exist, 
whose identity is contingent on our present decisions, and with whom cooperation is 
unfeasible. Assume, however, that responses to these challenges are successful (for 
overviews, see Kumar, 2018; Meijers, 2018; Caney, 2018). A second, more relevant 
question for the issue at hand is what is owed, rather than whether anything is owed, to 
future generations. We need to ask, then, what the content of our duties to future 
generations is. A question sufficientarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian theories approach 
differently. 
Start with intergenerational sufficientarianism, according to which the duty each 
generation has toward subsequent generations is that of leaving conditions that allow a 
minimum threshold of living (Meyer and Roser, 2009; Gosseries, 2017). The view, which 
is most famously expressed by the Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainable 
development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987: 43), has various distinctive features. One is that our 
duty to leave enough for the future is largely independent from what we may end up having 
as a result of choice and circumstance, including what we inherit from past generations.1 
Another is that what counts as enough is typically defined, on this view, by reference to an 
objective standard, like basic needs or capabilities, rather than to future generations’ 
preferences—whose content is harder to foresee, especially as to distant generations, and 
																																								 																				
1 This contrasts with theories, whose discussion space limits forbid, that define what each cohort owes to 
subsequent cohorts in accordance to what they receive from past cohorts (e.g., Mulgan, 2006). 
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more contingent on prior generations’ own preferences through formal and informal 
education (Ekeli, 2007; Gosseries, 2017). 
One complication is how to define, and where to set, the relevant threshold. Rawls’ 
(1999: 159) “institutional sufficientarianism,” for example, holds that we have a duty to 
bequeath the conditions “needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over 
time.” Many, however, favor less taxing (and more specific) definitions of the threshold, 
like avoiding deprivation or meeting basic needs. But most would agree that, albeit hard to 
specify, sufficiency is a necessary element of what we owe to future generations. Is it also 
enough, however? Some think not (Casal, 2007; Caney, 2018). For, suppose we could 
greatly benefit later cohorts above the threshold or redress gross intergenerational 
inequalities at little or no cost to ourselves. It seems clear that we would then have a duty to 
do so, and that privileging the short term instead would be wrongful. A second, more 
demanding view involves, thus, a requirement to equalize generations by benefiting those 
who are worse off. A view that comes in roughly two forms: relational and distributive.  
Relational egalitarianism holds that what we should seek to equalize is not how 
benefits are distributed across generations but how generations relate to one another, such 
that all generations be treated as equals by preceding cohorts and relations of exploitation 
(Liberto, 2014) or domination (Katz, 2017) be avoided. The view may be apt for relations 
among overlapping generations (Bidadanure, 2016a). But it is less so, many argue, for 
intergenerational relations beyond the overlap (Caney, 2018). For the kind of exploitative 
or dominating relations this view seeks to root out typically require interaction between a 
perpetrator and a victim, which is only possible among contemporaries. Failing to abate 
climate change due to an excessive focus on the short term may, then, wrong future people. 
But it is unclear whether it also involves exploiting or dominating them.  
Distributive egalitarianism, by contrast, seeks to equalize the allocation of morally 
relevant benefits—welfare, resources, or capabilities, to name some prominent candidates 
of the metric that, according to different proponents of this view, we should primarily use. 
On a strict variant, intergenerational egalitarianism is indifferent to the absolute level of 
benefits members of each generation enjoy. It is thus liable to the so-called leveling down 
objection: it could recommend, if growing prosperity is expected, that better-off 
generations’ position be worsened for the sake of equality, whose value is deemed intrinsic.  
On a prioritarian variant, by contrast, what matters is not equality per se but 
benefitting those who are worst-off (Parfit, 1997). And doing so matters more the worse off 
the worst-off are. Prioritarianism has, in brief, an intrinsic tendency toward equality. For 
between two cohorts whose prospects are uneven it favors that the position of the worse off 
cohort be enhanced—which has led some, like Fleurbaey (2015), to argue that 
prioritarianism and strict egalitarianism largely overlap as to their practical 
recommendations. But it does not value equality as such, and thus avoids the leveling down 
objection.  
When applied to nonoverlapping generations, however, egalitarianism is liable to 
important concerns (Meyer and Roser, 2009; Casal, 2019). First, to justify it, we cannot 
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resort to many of the instrumental reasons to denounce inequality among contemporaries, 
such as its effects on crime, distrust, physical and mental illness, teenage pregnancy, drug 
use, obesity, or pollution—effects that inequality among distant cohorts may not yield. Nor 
can we resort to intrinsic condemnations of inequality, which may not be objectionable 
across distant cohorts. Second, pursuing intergenerational equality (or priority) across 
distant generations would impose overwhelming computational burdens. How can we 
ascertain what would make future people, whose preferences and conditions are likely to 
radically differ from ours, neither worse off nor better off than us? Finally, 
intergenerational equality would be awfully hard to realize, given the vast institutional 
apparatus needed to achieve it and the inescapable power asymmetry between present and 
later generations. 
Egalitarianism is, in brief, apt to define our duties toward younger cohorts but not 
toward those yet to come, for which sufficientarianism is better suited. For example, given 
that sufficientarianism is concerned with the absolute position of future generations, it can 
be justified with no reference to the intrinsic or instrumental worth of their position relative 
to that of past or subsequent cohorts. And it is also informationally less exacting and easier 
to politically realize, given that it is merely concerned with avoiding that anyone falls 
below certain minimal threshold—one that, in addition, is defined in preference-insensitive 
terms, like avoiding deprivation or protecting basic needs.  
When, and to what extent, short-termism in policymaking is wrongful will hinge, 
then, on two things. The first is the time horizon of the relevant policy choice: whether it is 
likely to only affect those who, like children, are not yet citizens, to whom equality is owed, 
or will also affect those who are not yet born, to whom sufficiency is owed. The second is 
whether privileging the short term would infringe the duties we may then have for that 
particular policy choice. 
 
2. Future-beneficial and future-focused institutions 
 
Let us now consider institutional responses to wrongful short-termism. It is commonplace 
to view such responses as a means to correct democracies’ built-in bias toward the present. 
On a popular view, shared by scholars and citizens alike, electoral cycles, voters’ myopia, 
and incumbents’ desire to remain in office inexorably yield policies that privilege 
immediate benefits over future payoffs (Nordhaus, 1975; Thompson, 2010). Yet, although 
electoral pressures toward the short term are no doubt daunting, the record of existing 
democracies offers a more complicated picture. Democratic governments display an ample 
range of intertemporal choices: they greatly vary as to how much public debt they amass, 
how much they invest in education, or how well they preserve their forests (Jacobs, 2011; 
MacKenzie, 2018). Given that you cannot explain a variable with a constant, as the saying 
goes, we should probably ask, then, not what can be done to mitigate democracy’s short-
termism, but what makes some democracies less prone to short-termism and more caring 
about the future than others. 
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One way to approach this question is to separate out future-focused from future-
beneficial institutional setups (González-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016b). Future-focused 
institutions, like specialized agencies and budgetary rules, have promoting intertemporally 
appropriate policies as their main purpose. Future-beneficial institutions, by contrast, do so 
as a byproduct of pursuing other goals. I will here zoom in on the former, which have 
dominated recent debates, especially among normative theorists (Tremmel, 2006; 
Thompson, 2010; Gardiner, 2014; Caney, 2016; Smith, 2019). But there is a growing 
literature on how institutions whose chief aim is not to promote farsighted policies, like 
proportional electoral rules (Lindvall, 2017; Finnegan, 2019), government transparency 
(Aguiar, et al., 2019), institutional capacity (Jacobs, 2011), and low corruption (Garri, 
2010), crucially contribute to this end. Given that the diversity of sources of short-termism 
(see next section) invites a diversity of institutional responses, and that future-beneficial 
institutions may be easier to adopt, as they can be justified on independent grounds, one can 
only hope that research on future-beneficial institutions will further grow.  
Future-focused institutions, on which the rest of the chapter will focus, seek to 
extend the temporal gaze of policymaking not as a side effect of pursuing other purposes 
but as their main or even sole purpose. They abound, comprising ombudspersons for future 
generations, foresight practices, youth quotas, budgetary rules, deliberative minipublics, 
intergenerational trust funds, climate banks, and parliamentary committees, to mention 
some. For tractability, I here inspect two types that have elicited much recent debate: 
insulating and constraining devices (Brunner, et al., 2012; Jacobs and Matthews, 2017; 
Boston, 2017: 186 ff.). 
 
2.1. Insulating devices 
 
Insulating devices aim at extending the temporal gaze of policy choices by shielding them 
from short-termist pressures. Commitment theorists, for example, have long argued that 
long-term policy commitments may be easier to adopt, harder to renege, and more credible 
if (some) policymaking authority is transferred away to bodies whose members are not 
elected by citizens, nor directed by elected officials, and thus less liable to electoral 
pressures (Majone, 1996). Similarly, some democratic theorists have argued that delegation 
to unelected bodies that are appointed by elected officials yet do not serve at their pleasure 
may avoid that policymaking be dominated by electoral motives (Pettit, 2012: ch. 4). 
Depending on their authority, insulating devices can take the form of an agency or a 
watchdog (Brunner, et al., 2012). Agencies wield final authority to enact certain policies on 
the government’s behalf (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2003). Independent central banks and 
constitutional courts are clear examples. But some have suggested that an energy agency 
tasked with meeting an emission target by, for example, setting a carbon tax could play an 
analogous role (Helm, et al., 2003). 
Watchdogs, by contrast, are bodies whose authority is restricted to advising and 
monitoring the government on certain areas. Independent offices for future generations, 
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such as those established in 2001 in Israel, in 2008 in Hungary, and in 2016 in Wales, are 
illustrative (Boston, 2017; Smith, 2019). They typically lack legislative or executive 
authority, though they may also wield some quasi-governing powers. For example, the 
Israeli Commissioner for Future Generations, which was discontinued after one term, had 
authority to delay legislation that could potentially harm future generations (Shoham and 
Lamay, 2006). And the Hungarian Commissioner for Future Generations, whose primary 
task was to safeguard the constitutional right to a healthy environment for future 
generations, could suspend administrative orders and seek action from the Constitutional 
Court until its status was downgraded in 2012. 
This is just one possible way of insulating policymaking—one that seeks to do so by 
screening out those who, like elected officials, are deemed more prone to short-termism. 
Alternatively, policymaking may be insulated by screening in or upgrading the power of 
those who presumably are future-friendlier, as Dobson (1996) and Bidadanure (2016b) 
have suggested, respectively, as to members of environmental associations and to the 
youth. On Dobson’s much-discussed proposal, seats in parliament are reserved for 
representatives of future generations, who are elected among and by environmental 
activists. On Bidadanure’s proposal, youth quotas are introduced in parliament (see also 
van Parijs, 1998, and Karnein and Roser, 2015, for detailed discussion). 
 
2.2. Constraining devices 
 
Instead of transferring authority away from elected officials, as insulating devices do, 
constraining devices seek to bind elected officials to intergenerationally appropriate rules 
from which deviation is costly. 
Constitutionalizing norms of intergenerational fairness, which many countries have 
done in recent decades, often coupled with requirements to foster sustainable development 
and with fiscal rules, is one means to this end (May and Daly, 2015; González-Ricoy and 
Rey, 2019). The basic idea is that constitutional provisions enjoy normative priority over 
ordinary statutes, can only be amended by means that are costlier than ordinary lawmaking 
procedures, like qualified majority requirements, and are often enforceable by courts, which 
may review legislative and administrative actions deviating from their content, as courts in 
the Philippines, Chile, and the Netherlands and have done in recent decades.2 So 
constitutionalization makes it harder for present and future incumbents to deviate from the 
provisions’ content. 
Budgetary rules, such as hypothecated taxes and trust funds, may perform a similar 
task at the statutory level (Patashnik, 2000; Brunner, et al. 2012). For they require that 
certain revenues be earmarked for a predeclared public policy purpose, like investing in 
																																								 																				
2 See Supreme Court of the Philippines. Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (1991); Supreme Court of Chile. Comunidad de Chañaral v. Codelco División el Saldor 
(1997); Hague District Court. Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands (2015); Hague Court of 
Appeal. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation (2018). 
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early education or financing green technology. Given that their goals are also typically 
broken down into near-term targets that make deviations easy to detect, often provoking 
media and public outrage when they occur, they create strong incentives for elected 
officials not to deviate from their content. 
We must finally note that, notwithstanding their disparities, neither insulating devices 
nor constraining devices seek to alter individuals’ motivations, as alternative devices do—
exogenously, for example, through education (Zwarthoed, 2015), or endogenously, through 
deliberation (MacKenzie, 2018). Insulating and constraining devices, by contrast, do not 
aim to directly change individuals’ motivations, though they may indirectly have this effect, 
as we will see below. 
 
3. Evaluative criteria 
 
Next consider two normative criteria to assess insulating and constraining devices: their 
effectiveness to cope with the various sources of wrongful short-termism and their 
legitimacy in allocating power, intra- and intergenerationally. 
 
3.1. Effectiveness 
 
The chief criterion to assess future-focused institutions is, of course, how effective they are 
at keeping wrongful short-termism at bay, and doing it with as low opportunity costs as 
possible and with the ability to remain in operation over time. We need to first know, then, 
what drives policymaking toward the short term. One way to approach this is to link the 
sources of short-termism to different types of political actors, like voters, politicians, 
special interest groups, and (the powerlessness of) future generations (MacKenzie, 2016). 
Another, which I here lean on, is to distinguish sources of short-termism according to 
whether they are of a motivational, epistemic, or institutional nature (González-Ricoy and 
Gosseries, 2016b; Boston, 2017). 
Motivational determinants include voters’ impatience and incumbents’ desire to 
remain in office. Coupled with electoral competition, they offer a clear prediction of policy 
myopia. For, as noted above, if voters have a preference for immediate benefits, then 
incumbents seeking reelection have strong incentives to privilege policies yielding such 
benefits—“myopic policies for myopic voters,” as Edward Tufte (1978: 143) noted. It is 
important to distinguish, however, pure time preference, which refers to a preference for 
immediate utility over delayed utility and is purely motivational, from time discounting, 
which refers to a preference for immediate consequences irrespective of the reason to value 
future consequences less, some of which may not be motivational (Frederick, et al., 2002). 
For example, Frederick (2003) finds that individuals’ inclination to value future lives less 
than present lives largely results from uncertainty about whether future people will exist or 
whether long-term investments will benefit them, rather than from an intergenerational time 
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preference. Once uncertainty is controlled for, individuals no longer value future 
generations less. 
Epistemic determinants, on the other hand, include ignorance, various cognitive 
biases, and uncertainty. To illustrate, take climate policies. Voters and policymakers may 
discriminate against long-term benefits of mitigation policies, to start, if they ignore the 
harmful long-term effects that unabated climate change may yield. They may also do so if 
they happen to underestimate the likelihood of future disasters or to disdain abstract future 
harms whose victims are unidentifiable (Irving, 2009). And they may likewise do so if they 
are uncertain about who, and how many, will live in the future; about the world they will 
inhabit, including their technology to adapt to climate change; and about the likelihood of 
present policies yielding the promised long-term benefits, given the causal complexity 
involved (Jacobs and Matthews, 2017; van der Steen and van Twist, this volume). 
Finally, consider institutional determinants. Suitably motivated and informed 
policymakers may still lack the institutional ability to produce long-term policy outcomes. 
For example, existing institutions may be too weak (Jacobs, 2011) or corrupt (Garri, 2010). 
And policymakers may also be liable to collective action problems (Gardiner, 2011; 
Brunner, et al., 2012: Goetz, 2014). These may be synchronic, such as when taking long-
term climate action requires that other polities or private actors take it too, and a temptation 
to free ride on others’ efforts exists. And they may be diachronic, such as when long-term 
action requires continued investment, which future incumbents need to uphold but may be 
tempted, for ideological or electoral reasons, to renege. 
In addition, how effective future-focused institutions are, also hangs on their 
opportunity costs and on their ability to remain in operation over time. Opportunity costs 
comprise both foregone opportunities to invest in alternative institutions and, given that 
citizens’ attention is scarce, cognitive opportunity costs. Three implications follow. First, 
though the causes of short-termism are diverse, such that tackling them will require a 
diversity of responses, there is always a cost in establishing a new institution. Parsimony 
matters. It also entails that if one institution (or cluster of institutions) is computationally 
less taxing than some alternative, then a pro tanto reason to adopt the former exists. It 
finally entails that institutions should not be assessed in isolation. We should also consider 
how a new device affects the existing institutional ecology, including its potential crowding 
out effects.  
The ability to remain in operation over time is also important. For long-term 
investments often need to be sustained over long stretches of time, cutting across successive 
electoral cycles (Jacobs, 2011; Goetz, 2014; Caney, 2016). Further, given that sunk costs 
may be incurred when long-term investments are made, future-focused institutions that are 
easy to undo because their parliamentary support is fragile or can be discontinued by simple 
majority, and whose prospects to remain in operation are small, may be less effective than 
establishing no such institution in the first place. 
 
3.2 Procedural legitimacy 
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Consider now legitimacy criteria to assess future-focused institutions, which can be 
empirical and normative, substantive and procedural, and intra- and intergenerational. I 
here focus on normative and procedural criteria, both intra- and intergenerational. 
Normative legitimacy has traditionally been conceived of as the right to rule, as the 
right that legitimate states have to issue and coercively enforce legal directives. What this 
view arguably entails is that institutions with no coercive authority, like merely advisory 
bodies, are largely immune to legitimacy assessments (Beckman and Uggla, 2016). But this 
is too narrow a view. Coercion surely sets the bar of legitimacy higher. Yet noncoercive 
institutions (think, for example, of a watchdog that acts ultra vires or grossly misuses public 
funds) are also liable to legitimacy concerns. What is at stake when we make legitimacy 
assessments is the broader issue of whether an institution merits our moral reason-based 
support (Adams, 2018; Buchanan, 2018). 
Two clusters of conditions are relevant to assess whether future-focused institutions 
merit such support. Substantive conditions hang on their outcomes, and largely overlap 
with the effectiveness conditions discussed above. Procedural conditions, on which I here 
focus, hang on how such outcomes are brought about. They hang, in brief, on their ability 
to mitigate short-termism without infringing principles of procedural fairness—like those 
of political equality, democratic control, and sovereignty—in allocating power. 
Intragenerationally applied, these principles are straightforward. They require that no 
individual or group be granted more power than other contemporaries to decide on the 
future. They also require that decision makers be authorized by and accountable to the 
relevant constituency. And they finally require that, in areas in which no duty toward future 
generations exists, because their interests are likely to be unaffected, such interests be 
ignored. For the opposite would amount to the subjection of present generations by future 
cohorts.  
Intergenerationally applied, principles of procedural legitimacy are less clear. Take 
democratic control first. Though political institutions, to be legitimate, typically require 
authorization by and/or accountability to those whose interests are potentially affected, 
unborn generations and children below certain age are unable, for obvious reasons, to do 
this. But, just as safeguarding the interests of an unconscious patient could replace the need 
for informed consent to render a medical intervention legitimate, promoting future interests 
in policymaking, which is the very purpose of future-focused institutions, could replace the 
need for authorization and accountability to render such institutions legitimate (González-
Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016b: 18). How fittingly they represent and safeguard such interests 
will crucially inform, then, how legitimate such institutions are.3 
What political equality and sovereignty mean intergenerationally is also moot. A 
classic concern, which Jefferson and Condorcet already flagged, is that some institutions 
																																								 																				
3 On how, and whether, future interests may be represented in present policymaking, see Karnein (2016), 
Lawrence and Köhler (2017), González-Ricoy and Rey (2019), and Campos (2020). 
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unevenly allocate power across generations (Holmes, 1988; Otsuka, 2003; Gosseries, 
2016). Constitutions in particular, whose content is hard to amend, could thwart future 
generations’ ability to live under laws of their own choosing. Some, however, have resisted 
this idea by denying that extragenerational jurisdiction is possible. “Only the future can 
enforce the law of the future,” Beckman (2013: 781) for example argues. “Thus, no law 
ever applies to the future unless affirmed by future people themselves.” 
One response is that, though enforcement across nonoverlapping generations is 
impossible, each generation will always have to agree with the rest in the overlap to amend 
the constitution. A two-thirds majority requirement, for example, will then make it hard for 
each single generation to amend the constitution. And, given that the shift from one overlap 
to the next is continuous, we are always in an overlap context (Gosseries, 2016: 105). 
Alternatively, we could accept that jurisdiction beyond the overlap is possible. Suppose that 
a simple majority of all generations alive at some point wished to amend the constitution 
without entirely replacing it. It would be contentious to say that a two-thirds majority 
requirement does not restrict their ability to do so (compared to the simple majority 
required by ordinary lawmaking) because they could pass the amendment by 
extraconstitutional means or by replacing the entire constitution. For this would amount to 
saying that an intrusive mother in law is innocuous because you could always get rid of her 
by divorcing your wife (whom you wish to stay married to). By the same token, in 
entrenching some laws against change, the founding generations can legally threaten 
subsequent generations’ sovereignty because, in so doing, they can place the latter before 
this kind of tradeoffs. 
 
4. Assessing future-focused institutions 
 
We are now ready to discuss the effectiveness and legitimacy of insulating and constraining 
devices. I do not take up the gargantuan task of inspecting each and every criterion set out 
in the previous section for every instance of each device. Bearing in mind that institutional 
design is highly contingent on each country’s institutional ecology, I rather discuss their 
main potential merits and weaknesses as to their effectiveness and legitimacy. 
Before starting off, it is important to mention two important ways in which insulating 
and constraining devices may similarly contribute to keeping short-termist pressures at bay. 
First, both devices may overcome collective action problems by enabling credible 
commitment (Brunner, et al., 2012). Take climate change policy. By transferring some 
authority over climate policy to an office at arm’s length from government, or by 
earmarking certain tax for investment in clean technology, for example, governments may 
credibly signal that they are “on board” with the long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. In so doing, they may induce third parties, like companies and investors, to 
likewise reduce their emissions, on the assumption that it will be costly for present and 
future incumbents to renege this commitment and to free ride on their efforts (Helm, et al., 
2003).  
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Second, constraining and insulating devices may also importantly tackle citizens’ 
short-termist motivations as well as their unawareness and cognitive biases by shaping 
public opinion. For example, by establishing independent offices for future generations, in 
particular if they have some bite, or by granting principles of intergenerational fairness 
constitutional status, governments can credibly signal to the public how important 
intergenerational matters are, inducing citizens to update their values and beliefs on such 
matters, as the literature on the expressive effects of the law suggests (e.g., McAdams, 
2015).  
It is also worth noting, before discussing legitimacy considerations, that there is no 
reason why the burden of proof should fall on future-focused institutions. Existing 
institutions are also liable to legitimacy concerns, as some of our present policies may 
importantly thwart future generations’ interests, infringing our duties toward them 
(Dobson, 1996; O’Neill, 2001; Beckman, 2013). Future-focused institutions need 
justification no less than the status quo. Thus, in examining whether certain device merits 
our moral reason-based support, we must compare it not just to alternative devices 
(insulating, constraining, or otherwise) but also to existing institutions. 
 
4.1. Insulating devices 
 
Insulating devices are often seen as trading procedural legitimacy for effectiveness. In 
transferring authority away from officials that are liable to short-termist electoral pressures, 
they seem to aptly extend policy choices’ temporal gaze. Yet this comes at a cost. For, in so 
doing, they appear to importantly deviate from principles of accountability and political 
equality. This picture, however, is simplistic. On closer inspection, numerous limitations as 
to their effectiveness arise. And steps may also be taken to mitigate some of the legitimacy 
problems they raise.  
Start with effectiveness. Insulating devices aim, to repeat, at sheltering policymaking 
from short-termist pressures, such as electoral cycles. They do so by delegating authority to 
officials who are neither directly elected by the people, nor accountable to them, and can 
thus more easily avoid blame for risky, farsighted policy choices. This is true of delegation 
to independent agencies and watchdogs no less than of Dobson’s proposal to reserve seats 
in parliament for representatives of future generations. For the latter would also be shielded 
from short-termist pressures from the electorate at large, as they would be elected among 
and by members of environmentalist associations, on the assumption that these are more 
aptly motivated than other citizens. 
Yet, mere independence need not entail willingness to adopt more intertemporally 
balanced policies. Absent further conditions, like those related to the specific mandate that 
binds insulated officials, which we discuss below, why should we assume that they will be 
future-friendlier than elected ones? A plausible response is that independent bodies 
typically staff trained specialists, whose expertise exceeds that of elected officials, and that 
parliamentary representatives on Dobson’s proposal would be elected among future-
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friendlier citizens. Expertise, however, says nothing about officials’ particular goals. For 
example, the motivations and goals of central bankers (Adolph, 2013) and judges (Schauer, 
1999), to name two cases of insulation from electoral pressures, seem not to be any less 
partisan than those of ordinary citizens. With regard to Dobson’s proposal, on the other 
hand, one may ask why environmentalists should be assumed to be less prone to short-
termism than others, not just as to environmental lawmaking but also as to the range of 
areas on which members of parliament legislate. After all, other citizens may be active on 
other intertemporally relevant fronts, like education or poverty, out of concern for future 
generations (González-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016b). 
As to their ability to tackle the epistemic sources of short-termism, insulating devices 
yield mixed results. Expert input is no doubt crucial to tackle various epistemic 
determinants (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002). It may, for example, increase public 
awareness of overlooked long-term issues. And it may likewise counter citizens’ inclination 
to disdain future harms by offering reliable information and vivid examples, and yield 
better informed and less partisan policymaking on long-term issues. Insulation also allows 
for more flexibility than constraining devices to react to changing circumstances and to 
integrate new information about, for example, climate change damages or macroeconomic 
trends (Brunner, et al., 2012). Given that changes in circumstances and information are 
often likelier the longer the time horizon of the relevant policy choice and, thus, the more 
uncertainty involved (see, however, van Steen and van Twist, this volume), insulating 
devices are particularly well suited for policy choices whose effects extend over very long 
stretches of time.  
Yet, when authority is transferred away to independent bodies, insulation may also 
increase, rather than mitigate, uncertainty about whether the desired long-term policy 
outcomes will arrive. For insulating certain policy choices from electoral pressures does 
little to constrain policymakers’ room for maneuver. What is more, it also removes one 
potential tool to sanction them if they deviate from prior long-term commitments: the threat 
of electoral penalty. Indeed, in various survey experiments, Jacobs and Matthews (2017) 
find that insulating devices, unlike constraining devices, which we discuss below, yield no 
observable effect on support for long-term investments. For they do little to reduce the 
perceived political uncertainty about whether such investments will deliver the promised 
outcomes. Independent bodies, Jacobs and Matthews argue, place formidable 
computational demands on citizens, who typically ignore the motives of the officials that 
populate them and are thus reluctant to support them. This, in turn, raises concerns about 
the computational opportunity costs that such devices impose, given the demands to gather 
information about insulated officials’ ends they impose on citizens, as well as about their 
ability to secure ample support. 
Insulating devices encounter, thus, various hurdles to remain in operation over time, 
as the Israeli and the Hungarian offices for future generations, which lasted just one term 
before they were respectively discontinued and downgraded, can attest (Smith, 2019). One 
hurdle is, to repeat, citizens’ hesitation to support institutions whose monitoring is 
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informationally taxing. (Shoham and Lamay, 2006, also mention financial costs as one of 
the reasons why the Israeli office was suspended.) A second hurdle is that insulating 
devices are typically established by statute and can thus be easily discontinued. A third is 
that the primary constituency insulating devices seek to represent, minors and unborn 
generations, is powerless (Boston, 2017: 331). Some have argued, however, that 
embedding systematic participation from civil society associations in their operation may 
increase public support from present constituencies, rendering them less fragile if future 
incumbents attempt to discontinue them (Smith, 2019). 
Next consider procedural legitimacy concerns, starting with intergenerational ones. 
Given that insulating devices are easy to discontinue by future cohorts, they cause little 
trouble from the standpoint of generational sovereignty. But the concerns about their 
effectiveness that we have just discussed translate, absent further details about their powers 
and mandate, into serious intergenerational legitimacy concerns. For, as discussed in the 
previous section, given that authorization by and accountability to future generations is not 
possible, the risk that insulated officials use their independence to advance interests other 
than those of future individuals, yielding long-term outcomes that fail to benefit or may 
even harm them, is very real. 
In addition, given that insulated officials are neither authorized by nor accountable to 
present citizens, they are also liable to intragenerational concerns. Some have argued that, 
when insulating devices are established in response to political dysfunctionalities, like 
democracies’ tendency to privilege the short term, and are subject to revocation by elected 
legislatures, they need not raise serious intragenerational legitimacy concerns (Pettit, 2012; 
Smith, 2019). Others are more skeptical. In the particular case of bodies whose purpose is 
to advance the interests of future people, there is a risk over and above the general 
legitimacy concern that nonelected institutions raise (Waldron, 1999). The risk, Karnein 
(2016: 87) argues, is that, absent authorization/accountability, insulated officials “may find 
speaking in the name of future generations a convenient and self-righteous way to avoid 
their duties to contemporaries, by putting the alleged interests of future generations first.” 
They may, for example, deviate funds that could be profitably used for present purposes 
and whose diversion is harder to detect, given that their return is expected years or decades 
hence (Garri, 2010). 
How serious legitimacy concerns stemming from the lack of authorization and 
accountability are, depends, however, on insulating devices’ particular design. One aspect 
is the specific powers insulated officials are entrusted with, which can range from merely 
advising and monitoring governmental action to wielding full authority to enact policy. 
Another is the purview of such authority, which may encompass issues that are more or less 
politically contested and more or less technical. For example, courts have generally been 
reluctant to enforce constitutional norms of environmental safety, deferring action to 
legislatures instead, because, they have often argued, environmental decisions raise 
complex tradeoffs and have formidable distributive effects that elected institutions are more 
legitimate to assess (May and Daly, 2015). A third factor is the content of the mandate by 
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which insulated officials are bound. For narrowly defined goals and means to pursue them, 
which a sufficientarian view of our intergenerational duties would recommend, alongside 
exacting monitoring mechanisms and parliamentary control over their budget and titular, 
may importantly reduce insulated officials’ room for maneuver (Helm, et al., 2003; Brunner 
et al., 2012; González-Ricoy and Rey, 2019). And they may likewise reduce political 
uncertainty about long-term goals being delivered, hence mitigating intergenerational 
legitimacy concerns. 
Note, however, that many of these factors plot, as it were, against the very rationale 
behind insulating devices. If, for example, we submit insulated officials to a tight mandate 
and exacting monitoring by elected officials, we then also reduce their flexibility to cope 
with changing information and their immunity from electoral pressures. Also note that, 
though these factors may importantly mitigate legitimacy concerns, absent citizens’ 
authorization and accountability, such concerns are unlikely to entirely go away. Finally, 
note that these concerns are particularly intractable as to Dobson’s proposal. For one thing, 
given that parliamentary representatives of future generations would have open-ended 
lawmaking authority, no mandate of the above kind could mitigate concerns about their 
effectiveness and intergenerational legitimacy. For another, given that they would be 
elected by and solely accountable to other environmentalists, excluding other citizens, the 
intragenerational legitimacy concerns the proposal raises are probably insurmountable. 
 
4.2. Constraining devices 
 
Constraining devices elude some of the hurdles insulating devices face as to their 
effectiveness and legitimacy. But they encounter new ones, which I here discuss.  
Take motivational sources of short-termism first. Instead of delegating authority to 
nonelected officials, as insulating devices do, constraining devices seek to bind elected 
officials to intergenerationally apt rules from which deviation is costly. In so doing, they 
avoid leaning on a dubious inference from independence from electoral pressures to 
willingness to adopt intergenerationally fairer policies. Means to motivate officials to abide 
by such rules can take two forms. When granted constitutional status, rules enjoy normative 
priority over ordinary statutes, can only be amended by cumbersome means, and are often 
enforceable by courts, which may review, and sometimes revoke, statutes and 
administrative actions deviating from the rules’ content. Elected officials have reason, then, 
to comply with the rules, lest their actions be rendered unconstitutional by a court and 
accordingly turned down, and cannot easily change them.  
When constraining rules are adopted as statutory laws, none of these means are 
available. Given that they lack normative priority, that they can be changed by simple 
majority, and that they cannot be enforced through judicial review, some doubt whether 
they can have much effect on elected officials’ opportunistic or electoral temptations. But 
much depends on how they are designed. If long-term rules are clear, as when they require 
that certain revenue be earmarked for some predefined purpose, and are broken down into 
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near-term targets, then deviation may be easy to detect, triggering media outrage and loss of 
public support when it occurs (Patashnik, 2000; Jacobs and Matthews, 2017). If, in 
addition, they are designed to benefit present cohorts by, for example, reserving the 
proceeds of emission trading for redistribution to the poorest households, then public long-
term support is likely to increase, and so they are the costs of diversion (Brunner, et al., 
2012). 
How effectively constraining devices address the epistemic sources of short-termism 
also importantly hinges on their design. On the one hand, in setting out clear rules and 
shielding them from officials’ discretion, constraining devices are better equipped than 
insulating devices to mitigate uncertainty about whether the promised long-term payoffs 
will arrive (Jacobs and Matthews, 2017). On the other, however, they are also less flexible 
to cope with new information, which may result in less effective policies. Making rules 
easier to adapt to new conditions would create loopholes for opportunistic deviations, and 
attempting to foresee all future contingencies would be just impossible. But, serious though 
this problem is in areas that are liable to severe uncertainty and to recurrent information 
updates, like climate change abatement, certainty and flexibility need not be irreconcilable. 
For constraining rules may be adjusted to context-dependent factors whose content does not 
depend on governments. For example, rules setting the price or permissible quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions may be able to adapt to new circumstances without creating 
loopholes for opportunistic deviation, Brunner at al. (2012) argue, if we make them 
contingent on predefined parameters, like new insights in climate science or international 
climate agreements, that are independent from elected officials and hard to manipulate.  
Constraining devices’ ability to address political sources of short-termism, on the 
other hand, crucially depends on their prospects to remain in operation over time. For 
whether they successfully contribute to overcoming synchronic collective action problems, 
inducing public and private agents to coordinate around the long-term goals set by a new 
rule, importantly depends on whether such agents expect that the rule will not be easily 
changed or ignored by future incumbents. This, in turn, depends both on their legal status 
and their design. Constitutional rules are typically hard to amend, whereas simple 
majorities are often enough to change statutory law. But, as we have seen, various factors 
can render the latter more resilient to change. First, statutory rules may generate long-term 
public support if they are designed to benefit not just future constituencies but also present 
ones. They may also be harder to undo if they are designed to make officials’ attempts to 
change them easy to detect, as hypothecated taxes and trust funds aptly do. And, insofar as 
they make the outcomes of long-term investments less uncertain, they may likewise 
increase their public support, as Jacobs and Matthews (2017) argue. 
Finally, consider legitimacy concerns. Insofar as constraining devices are self-
imposed by parliaments, they raise few intragenerational difficulties. When they are 
granted constitutional status, however, they raise a well-known intergenerational concern 
(Otsuka, 2003; Gosseries, 2016; Tremmel, 2019). Given that future generations will have a 
hard time amending their content should they want to do so, constitutionalizing 
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constraining rules may end up imposing the will of the founding generations on subsequent 
ones, threatening the ability of the latter to live under laws of their own choosing. Briefly 
consider some responses to this concern (for more detailed discussion, see González-Ricoy, 
2016). One is that the concern only arises when constitutional norms seek to track and 
safeguard future preferences. Given that these are likely to evolve over time and across 
cohorts, the norms’ content, albeit well-intended, may end up unfittingly reflecting them. 
The concern largely disappears, on this view, when constitutional rules are limited to 
safeguarding future people’s basic needs, which are unlikely to change over time, as 
constraining devices on a sufficientarian view seek to do (Ekeli, 2007). 
In addition, how constraining devices are formulated and adopted may also mitigate 
the generational sovereignty concern. First, if constitutional provisions, unlike statutory 
rules, are formulated abstractly, as general principles rather than specific rules, future 
cohorts may be able to adjust their understanding to fit an evolving society, as generational 
change occurs and circumstances vary (Ferreres, 2000; Waluchow, 2007). Second, if the 
relevant provisions are adopted under conditions that are normatively more demanding than 
ordinary lawmaking conditions—if, say, they are adopted after a process of consultation 
and deliberation among parties, associations, and citizens and they reach ample, bipartisan 
support—difficulty to amend them may safeguard, rather than constrain, citizens’ will from 
the risk that elected officials may easily renege them (Ackerman, 1991). Although none of 
these responses is likely to make the intergenerational concern entirely go away, for future 
generations would be unable to easily amend the rules all the same, they may importantly 
mitigate it. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Normative theorists and social scientists studying intergenerational politics have profitably 
teamed up in recent years. They have inspected, among other things, our duties toward 
future generations, the drivers of political short-termism that hinder that such duties be 
discharged in public policymaking, and the conditions to render institutional responses to 
short-termism effective and legitimate. This chapter has surveyed recent normative research 
on these issues, focusing on two prominent responses: insulating and constraining devices.  
For all their virtues, however, these responses are no panacea. One reason is that, 
given that both our duties toward future generations and the sources of short-termism are 
diverse and vary across policy choices, a diverse mix of responses is needed. Another is 
that institutions that promote intertemporally fair policies not as their primary goal, as 
insulating and constraining devices do, but as a byproduct of pursuing other goals, like 
electoral rules or government transparency do, may also be critical to achieving this end, as 
growing research suggests. A third reason is that both the particular design and the viability 
of these and similar responses importantly hinges on each country’s institutional ecology. 
Further work linking normative theorizing and empirical research on these matters is, thus, 
badly needed. 
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